期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Ibero America Institute for Economic Research (IAI)
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Ibero America Institute for Economic Research
摘要：We focus on the role that the transmission of information
between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of
conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially
severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed
optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency
bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political
factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in
countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of
the countries’ authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the
theory.
关键词：IMF conditionality, delegation, communication, panel data
