首页    期刊浏览 2025年07月06日 星期日
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Dorothea Kubler ; Wieland Muller ; Hans Normann
  • 期刊名称:Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
  • 出版年度:2004
  • 卷号:2004
  • 出版社:University of London
  • 摘要:We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e¤ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate. More e¢cient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested. More e¢cient workers also earn higher wages. Employers’ pro…ts are usually not di¤erent from zero. Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions. We …nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.
  • 关键词:job-market signaling; job-market screening; sorting; Bayesian games; experiments.
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有