期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2004
卷号：2004
出版社：University of London
摘要：This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior,
for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous
domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative.
Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but nontrivial,
requirements for rationalizability, I show that the hypothesis is
falsifiable, as it imposes nontautological, nonparametric testable restrictions.
An assessment of these restrictions, however, shows that they are
extremely weak, and that a researcher should expect, before observing
the data set, that the test based on these restrictions will be passed by
observed data. Without further specific assumptions, there do not exist
harsher tests, since the conditions derived here also turn out to be
sufficient. Moreover, ruling out the possibility that individuals may be
cooperating so as to attain Pareto-efficient outcomes is impossible, as this
behavior is in itself unfalsifiable with finite data sets. Imposing aggregation,
or strategic complementarity and/or substitutability, if theoretically
plausible, may provide for a harsher test.
