期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2004
卷号：2004
出版社：University of London
摘要：In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of
exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each
one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set.
The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than
the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between
individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here
characterize collective choices in terms of the way in which individual
preferences must co-vary in order to explain them. I do this by combining
standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random
preferences. I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannot be
rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be
refuted.
关键词：Revealed preference, random utility; collective choice; individual
rationality.
