期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：University of London
摘要：We model the role of a parliament’s structure in shaping the accountability of
elected representatives. In a setting in which lawmakers interact with a lobby through
a bargaining process and with voters by means of elections, we show that only a single
legislative body who can make take it or leave it offers to the lobby can be held
unambiguously accountable to voters. Whenever the pressure group enjoys some bargaining
power, two chambers might instead provide better discipline, depending on
the rules governing their interaction, and in particular the allocation of the decision
powers among them. We show that bicameralism with restricted amendment rights
provides the best incentives, while unrestricted amendment rights result in a status quo
bias. Furthermore, by adding complexity of the legislative process, the presence of a
second chamber might lead to an undesirable outcome, i.e. a decline in the legislator’s
bargaining power vis `a vis the lobby and a reduction in his accountability. Arguments
suggesting that bicameralism is a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators
should therefore be taken with due caution.
