期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：University of London
摘要：We test core theories of the household using variants of a public good game and
experimental data from 240 couples in rural Uganda. Spouses do not maximise
surplus from cooperation and realise a greater surplus when women are in charge.
This violates assumptions of unitary and cooperative models. When women control
the common account, they receive less than when men control it; this contradicts
standard bargaining models. Women contribute less than men and are rewarded more
generously by men than vice versa. This casts doubt on postulates in Sen (1990).
While the absence of altruism is rejected, we find evidence for opportunism. The
results are put in a socioeconomic context using quantitative and qualitative survey
data. Assortative matching and correlates of bargaining power influence behaviour
within the experiments. Our findings suggest that a ‘one-size fits all’ model of the
household is unlikely to be satisfactory.
