期刊名称：Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics / Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business Management and Economics
印刷版ISSN：0945-4829
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Dresden
摘要：A theory is said to be fully absorbable whenever its own acceptance by all of the individuals belonging to a certain
population does not question its predictive validity. This accounts for strategic equilibria and can be related to the logic
underlying convergence of behaviour and intentional herding in sequential games. This paper discusses the
absorbability of informational cascades¡¯ theory by bounded rational decision-makers and analyses whether providing
individuals with theoretic information on informational cascades affects overall probability of herding phenomena to
occur as well as whether an incorrect cascade can be reversed because of bounded rational adapting of the theory¡¯s
prescriptive.
