期刊名称：Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics / Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business Management and Economics
印刷版ISSN：0945-4829
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Dresden
摘要：Political connections between firms and autocratic regimes are not secret and often even publicly displayed in many
developing economies. We argue that tying a firm¡¯s available rent to a regime¡¯s survival acts as a credible commitment
forcing entrepreneurs to support the government and to exert effort in its stabilization. In return, politically-connected
firms get access to profitable markets and are exempted from the regime¡¯s extortion. We show that such a gift exchange
between government and politically-connected firms can only exist if certain institutional conditions are met. In
particular, the stability of the regime has to be sufficiently low and the regime needs the power to exploit independent
firms. We also show that building up a network of politically-connected firms acts as a substitute for investments in
autonomous stability (such as spending on military and police force). The indirect strategy of stabilizing a regime via
politically-connected firms gradually becomes inferior when a regime¡¯s exploitative power rises.
关键词：Politically-Connected Firms, Clientelism, Political Stability
