期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2004
卷号：2004
出版社：Bergen
摘要：This paper presents a model of competition between two advertisingfinanced
media firms, and we apply the model to analyze competition between portals
on the Internet. First, we show that equilibrium prices of advertising are actually
higher the less differentiated the portals are perceived to be. Second, we show that
aggregate profit for the portals increases if they form each their vertical alliance with
advertisers. This is true even if there is perfect competition between the advertisers
for advertising space. However, we also demonstrate that it may be individually
profitable for one of the portals not to form a vertical alliance if the portals are
close substitutes. In that case we end up with an asymmetric equilibrium with only
one vertical alliance. This happens despite the fact that aggregate profit would be
higher with two vertical alliances.
