期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：Bergen
摘要：We introduce a model analyzing how asymmetric information problems in
a bank-loan market may evolve over the age of a borrowing firm. The model
predicts a life-cycle pattern for banks’ interest rate markup. Young firms pay
a low or negative markup, thereafter the markup increases until it falls for old
firms. Furthermore, the pattern of the life-cycle depends on the informational
advantage of the inside bank and when more dispersed borrower information
yields fiercer bank competition. By applying a new measure of the informational
advantage of inside banks and a large sample of small Norwegian firms,
we find empirical support for the predicted markup pattern. We disentangle
effects of asymmetric information (Akerlof effect) from effects of a concentrated
bank market (Herfindahl effect). Our results indicate that the interest
rate markups are not influenced by bank market concentration.
