期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：Bergen
摘要：Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity.
Monitoring improves credit allocation, but creates informational lock-in
effects in bank-borrower relationships. In a competitive credit market, banks
dissipate anticipated profit from serving locked-in borrowers subsequently revealed
to the bank as good to attract new borrowers with unknown credit
quality. Consequently, banks’ lending strategies result in cross-subsidies from
good to bad borrowers. We investigate how firms’ choice of debt structure
interacts with the cross-subsidies inherent in banks’ lending strategies. The
analysis sheds light on how dynamic bank competition determines monitoring
intensity, seniority, and maturity structure in bank dependent industries.
