期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：Bergen
摘要：I analyse whether multilateral lending may be justified in a world of global capital
markets if multilaterals have an informational advantage over lenders in the market for
sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved
through cheap-talk provided the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower
country welfare. However, when lending is unconstrained the private information of the
multilateral will be revealed whatever the relative weighting of welfare and lenders’ profits.
In contrast, restricted multilateral lending may worsen the problem compared to a situation
where the agency plays a purely informational role.
关键词：Multilateral financial institutions, surveillance, sovereign debt.
