期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：Bergen
摘要：There is a gap between the recommendations of the theory of second
degree price discrimination and the practices of firms that target consumer
segments with varying willingness to pay with two or more distinct tar-
iffs. We present a model where consumers’ private information is single
dimensional and the allocation rule is two-dimensional. In contrast to the
established result in nonlinear pricing, we find that the per-unit price may
be non-monotonic: low-demand consumers face a two-part tariff with a
per-unit price possibly below marginal cost, and even zero, whereas high-
demand consumers face tariffs with per-unit charges above marginal cost.
On the other hand, all consumers but the one on the top of the distri-
bution, are faced with a quality restriction, quality being monotonically
increasing in type. Finally, we show that this practice increases welfare
due to increased consumption efficiency.
