期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
出版社：Bergen
摘要：We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes
for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology
(the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance
to a subset of rivals. Allowing the non-license takers to remain active in the
market is a drain on the profit of the insiders, and we demonstrate that the
dominant firm will only make a transfer of the superior technology if it can be
used to foreclose some rival firms. Foreclosure of a subset of firms may thus
be the outcome even without restrictions on the licensing schemes. Moreover,
we show that when licensing is profitable, the dominant firm will prefer a
complete transfer even if a partial transfer can be made.
