期刊名称:Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN:0804-6824
出版年度:2008
卷号:2008
出版社:Bergen
摘要:This paper proposes a pricing framework that combines the oc-
currence of supply interruptions with .nancial compensations. Con-
sumers post ex ante demands for a designated period. These demands
are met if ex post supply capacity is su¢ cient. However, when supply
is inadequate, all ex ante demands will be equi-proportionally rationed
with compensation being paid for any unserved demand. Consumers
posts their demands based on their expectations on the reliability of
the supply system. The model is closed by imposing rational expecta-
tions. We identify that while a consumer.s ex ante power demand will
be decreasing in the power price and increasing in the compensation
rate, it will be increasing when there is a mean-preserving spread in
the riskiness of future supplies, provided the consumer is su¢ ciently
prudent, i.e., when his coe¢ cient of relative prudence exceeds two, and
his coe¢ cient of interruption aversion exceeds one. We also derive
the welfare maximising price and show that when consumers are su¢ -
ciently prudent, pessimistic (equilibrium) expectations on the supply
reliability warrant a higher price compared with a situation of supply
adequacy.