期刊名称：Discussion Papers / School of Business, University of New South Wales
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
出版社：Sydney
摘要：We revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes
in a mixed market with private and public rms. A departure from the
standard setting, i.e., one where all rms maximize pro ts, provides new insights.
A welfare-maximizing public rm's price is strictly lower while its output is strictly
higher in Cournot competition. And whereas the private rm's quantity is strictly
lower in Cournot (as in the standard setting), its price can be higher or lower.
Despite this ambiguity, both rms, public and private, earn strictly lower pro ts
in Cournot. The consumer surplus is strictly higher in Cournot under a linear demand
structure. All these results also hold with more than two rms under a wide
range of parameterizations. The ranking reversals also hold in a richer setting with
a partially privatized public rm, where the extent of privatization is endogenously
determined by a welfare-maximizing government. As a by-product of our analysis,
we nd that in a di
erentiated duopoly setting, partial privatization always
improves welfare in Cournot but not necessarily in Bertrand competition.
关键词：Bertrand, Cournot, public rms, partial privatization
