期刊名称：Discussion Papers / School of Business, University of New South Wales
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
出版社：Sydney
摘要：This paper analyzes the optimality of policy speci cations used to regulate the acquisition and
operation of local rms by multinational enterprises(MNE). We emphasize the consequence of such
regulation on the price of the domestic rm in the market for corporate control. We show that it is
optimal to impose ceilings on foreign ownership of domestic rms when the government's objective
is to maximize domestic shareholder pro ts. While the optimal ceiling is high enough for the MNE
to gain control of the domestic rm, it nevertheless inuences the price that the MNE must pay for
the domestic rm's shares to the advantage of the domestic shareholders. Restrictions on transfer
pricing are either irrelevant or strictly suboptimal. The consequences of alternative speci cations
of the government's objective function are also analyzed.
关键词：Acquisition, Control, Multinational Enterprises, Transfer pricing
