期刊名称：Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar / Universität Göttingen
出版年度：2004
卷号：2004
出版社：Universität Göttingen
摘要：In this paper we analyze the political economics of different
strategies to implement revenue neutral reforms of a complicated income tax
system ( tax-cut-cum-base-broadening ). We set up a straightforward social
choice model where individuals initially have two deduction possibilities from
the tax base. The government wants to cut back the tax base exemptions and it
can do so symmetrically or asymmetrically. Asymmetrical approaches face the
difficulty that even such individuals can vote against an isolated cut (or an
abolishment) of a single tax concession who benefit below average from it. In
some constellations a symmetrical cut is in fact the only politically feasible
option, whereas all asymmetrical reforms would not be supported by the public.
