期刊名称：DIW Diskussionspapiere / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
出版社：Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
摘要：This paper aims to explain the large premium paid on common (voting) shares
relative to preferred (non-voting) shares in the Russian stock market. Empirical
analysis focuses on two main explanations relating the premium either to the
voting right attached to common shares or to differences in liquidity between
the two classes of stock. Two avenues through which the right to vote may give
rise to the premium are distinguished. First, the presence of private benefits
of control and the possibility of control contests may make the votes held by
small investors pivotal, and therefore valuable. Second, non-voting shareholders
may be expropriated as a class by voting shareholders. Regression analysis of
RTS stock exchange data from 1997- 2005 provides support for the control contest
model of the premium as well as for the liquidity argument. The study finds no
evidence that the premium is related to expropriation of preferred shareholders
as a class.
