期刊名称：DIW Diskussionspapiere / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
出版社：Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
摘要：In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between
remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of
the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration
based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both
players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for each player for
cooperation, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free
ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe
that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private
remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option
of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.
