期刊名称：DIW Diskussionspapiere / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
出版社：Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
摘要：We analyze the listing decisions of a retailer who may ask her suppliers to make
upfront payments in order to be listed. We consider a sequential game with
upfront payments being negotiated before short-term delivery contracts. We show
that the retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the higher her
bargaining power and the higher the number of potential suppliers. Upfront
payments tend to lower the number of products offered by the retailer when the
products are rather close substitutes. However, upfront payments can increase
social welfare if they ameliorate inefficient listing decisions implied by
short-term contracts only.
