期刊名称：DIW Diskussionspapiere / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
出版社：Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
摘要：Our paper deals with modeling the effects of introducing a market-based tool for
improving end-users' efficiency in an energy market which is already regulated
through a cap-and-trade system for green house gas emissions and a quota system
meant to improve competitiveness of energy produced using renewable resources.
Our results show that the regulation of energy demand achieves its underlying
objects of energy savings and energy efficiency solely at the expense of other
goals such as the environmental efficiency of energy production. In our model,
the implementation of a market for White Certificates (WCTS) causes energy
producers' investment in abatement to decrease along with the price for Brown
Certificates and the amount of renewable energy demanded. Once we turn to the
currently more empirically relevant case of integrating end-users only partially
into WCTS, the unregulated group compensates in parts for the decrease in demand
of the regulated group, due to an indirect price effect. As both supply and
demand side of the market are regulated, this special set of regulations applied
can, therefore, be compared to the grip of pincers embracing the entire market,
leaving some of it virtually scarred. Consequently, we intended to search for
alternative policy measures, which are able to achieve an increase in end-users'
energy efficiency without the negative side-effects witnessed in case of a WCTS.
In our model a subsidized reduction in the price for households' investment in
energy efficiency renders just slightly more favorable results than an
implementation of WCTS. However, the most effective way to accomplish all goals
of environmental policy alike is to reduce the cap on emissions.
