期刊名称：DIW Diskussionspapiere / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
出版社：Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
摘要：This paper presents results of simulating a more collusive behavior of a group
of natural gas producing and exporting countries, sometimes called GASPEC. We
use the World Gas Model, a dynamic, strategic representation of world gas
production, trade, and consumption between 2005 and 2030. In particular, we
simulate a closer cooperation of the GASPEC countries when exporting pipeline
gas and liquefied natural gas; we also run a more drastic scenario where GASPEC
countries deliberately withhold production. The results shows that compared to a
Base Case, a gas cartel would reduce total supplied quantities and induce price
increases in gas importing countries up to 22%. There is evidence that the
natural gas markets in Europe and North America would be affected more than
other parts of the world. Lastly, the vulnerability of gas importers worldwide
on gas exporting countries supplies is further illustrated by the results of a
sensitivity case in which price levels are up to 87% higher in Europe and North
America, but non-GEC countries increase production by a mere 10%.
关键词：natural gas, trade, cartel, collusion, World Gas Model
