期刊名称：Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology
出版年度：2001
卷号：1
出版社：Bepress
摘要：The Rule of One-Third guaranteed
wives a life interest in one-third of their husband's estate upon marital
dissolution. We document the ubiquity of this legal construct over four thousand
years and across numerous societies. Due to specialization within the household,
we demonstrate that without a wife's residual claim on her husband's estate,
children's outcomes are imperiled. Using ancient Roman law as an example, we
argue that the patriarch, or paterfamilias, is the primary legal entity with an
interest in creating and enforcing the Rule of One-Third. Then, in a
game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that the Rule of One-Third obtains when
mothers' and fathers' are equally important at producing children's human
capital, and when this rule is enforced by the paterfamilias or by modern legal
institutions. We conclude that the Rule of One-Third arose in many societies
because it places the cost of marital dissolution on the household rather than
society, and solves a contracting problem between the husband and wife when each
is specialized in tasks the other cannot perform well
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