期刊名称：Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology
出版年度：2001
卷号：2
出版社：Bepress
摘要：This paper presents a growth
model in which property rights are insecure and costly to enforce. Losses of
property provide the impetus to establish institutions which seek to enforce
property rights. Institutions are shown to implement policies that enforce
property rights. The model establishes that economies in which the institutional
structure does not adequately protect property rights grow slowly, or not at
all, while countries with better property rights protection grow in accordance
with the standard neoclassical model. Because income inequality is a primary
incentive to violate another's property rights, the model also provides a
positive theory of income redistribution. Empirical tests of the model's
predictions demonstrates that government expenditures that enforce property
rights raise per capita income growth.
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