出版社：Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training
摘要：Turning to Robert Lund, the supervising engineer, [Jerald] Mason
[then senior vice president of Morton Thiokol, Inc.] directed him
to ¡°take off your engineering hat and put on your management
hat.¡± The earlier no-launch recommendation was reversed.
Roger Boisjoly was deeply upset by this reversal of the
engineers¡¯ recommendation¡¡.¡ªhe was an engineer. It was his
professional engineering judgment that the O-rings were not
trustworthy. He also had a professional obligation to protect the
health and safety of the public, and he evidently believed that this
obligation extended to the astronauts. Now his professional
judgment was being overridden [emphasis in original]. (C. E.
Harris, Jr., M. S. Pritchard and M. J. Rabins, Engineering Ethics:
Concepts and Cases, 5)
Group leader Yoshida then feared that this unfolding situation
could lead to a crisis that would threaten the survival of the
company [Mitsubishi Motors], and resolved that ¡°in order to
protect the company from the Ministry of Transport¡¯s audits, I
would persist with the fabrication in my position as a manager in the
Quality Assurance Department¡± [emphasis added]. (T. Okuyama,
The Power of Internal Whistle-blowing: What Does the Whistleblower
Protection Act Protect?, 24)
The next day, just 73 seconds into the launch, the Challenger
exploded, taking the lives of the six astronauts and schoolteacher
Christa McAuliffe [emphasis in original]. (Engineering Ethics:
Concepts and Cases, 6)
