摘要：The United States Supreme Court correctly recognized in the 2004 Hood and
2006 Katz cases that the fundamental nature of bankruptcy cases and proceedings is
distinct from litigation of statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause or other
sections of Article I of the Constitution, in a way that is critical to sovereign
immunity analysis.1 Unlike the laws at issue in the Seminole Tribe and other nonbankruptcy
sovereign immunity cases before Hood and Katz, the substantive
provisions of bankruptcy statutes are not regulatory laws, and do not apply to the
populace at large or mandate or proscribe any action in the course of everyday
affairs. Bankruptcy laws only apply in conjunction with bankruptcy cases
adjudicating the status of the bankrupt debtor. Effectively, the federal government
supplies the forum and standards for resolution of private debt matters. Unlike
federal regulatory statutes that are enforceable by federal authorities, bankruptcy
discharges, the automatic stay, preference actions and the like are enforceable only
by debtors and creditors, and only in the context of specific bankruptcy cases, not
by United States Attorneys or federal agencies in federal or state court suits. It is
only private parties who can enforce such bankruptcy law provisions through
bankruptcy court proceedings in specific debtors' bankruptcy cases.
