摘要：In his paper The Inference to the Best Explanation, Gilbert Harman explains his
position on enumerative induction. He first argues that inferences that seem to
be instances of enumerative induction are actually better explained as inferences
to the best explanation (IBE). He claims that the former are actually
“uninteresting special case[s] of the more general inference to the best
explanation” (Harman, 1965). Indeed, according to Harman, all cases of
enumerative induction can be explained using IBE, making the former
redundant as a separate form of inference. By contrast, the use of IBE need
never be accompanied by enumerative induction, i.e. there are no situations that
can be explained by the latter but not by the former. Enumerative induction is
the process whereby a conclusion about, say, type A, is drawn based on several
examined cases of type A. An often-cited example is as follows: if we observe
one white swan, and then observe another white swan, and then another, up to a
very large number of observations of white swans (with no exceptions), then we
are likely to conclude that all swans are white. We have thus extrapolated from
observed instances to a general conclusion that applies to other cases that are as
of yet unobserved. Harman's second main argument in favor of his view is that
in selecting a hypothesis to explain certain evidence, we often make use of
certain lemmas. The use of these lemmas, according to Harman, is obscured if
the process of hypothesis selection is described as one of enumerative induction,
whereas the use of IBE appropriately highlights them as crucial steps in arriving
at an explanation.
