期刊名称：Discussion Papers / School of Business, University of New South Wales
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Sydney
摘要：A two-stage bargaining model is developed to describe how fertility decisions are made
in a strategic family setting. Given the assumption that family contracts are incom-
plete and cannot be used to enforce optimal behavior, it is shown that investments in
children (i.e. the fertility rate) may be sub-optimal. This is because the woman may
nd it in her interest to invest too little in children in stage 1 of the model in order to
protect her bargaining status in stage 2. I then consider in the context of this model
the impact on fertility rates of changes in child custody rules (in the case of divorce),
the wage rate, and the male-female wage di
erential. I conclude by exploring how the
introduction of child subsidies can change the results
