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文章基本信息

  • 标题:COSTLY NETWORK FORMATION AND REGULAR EQUILIBRIA
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:FRANCESCO DE SINOPOLI† ; CARLOS PIMIENTA‡
  • 期刊名称:Discussion Papers / School of Business, University of New South Wales
  • 出版年度:2009
  • 卷号:2009
  • 出版社:Sydney
  • 摘要:We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets
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