期刊名称：Discussion Papers / School of Business, University of New South Wales
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Sydney
摘要：We investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay as you go (PAYG) social
security system in a dynastic framework in which agents have self-control problems. The
presence of these two additional factors at the same time affects individuals’ intertemporal
decision problems in two opposite directions. That is, on the one hand individuals prefer
to save more because of their altruistic concerns, on the other hand, they prefer to save
less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption. Individuals’ efforts
to balance between the long-term commitment (consumption smoothing and altruism) and
the short-term urge for temptation result in self-control costs. In this environment the
existence of social security system provides not only consumption smoothing and risk-
sharing mechanisms but also a channel that reduces the severity of temptation. We find
that the adverse welfare effects of a PAYG system are further mitigated relative to the
environments that incorporates altruism and self control issues separately
关键词：Temptation; Self-control preferences; Altruism; Social security; Dynamic
general equilibrium; Overlapping generations; Welfare.
