期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Bergen
摘要：This paper studies the optimal income redistribution and monitoring when disability benefits are
intended for disabled people but where some able agents with high distastes for work mimic them
(type II errors). Labor supply responses are at the extensive margin and endogenous takeup
costs burden disabled recipients (due to a reputational externality caused by cheaters or due to
a snowball effect). Under a non-welfarist criterion which does not compensate for distaste for
work, (inactive) disabled recipients get a strictly lower consumption than disabled workers. The
usual conditions under which the optimal transfer program is a Negative Income Tax or an Earned
Income Tax Credit are challenged, due to monitoring. We also show that even if perfect monitoring
is costless, it is optimal to have type II errors. These results are robust to a utilitarian criterion.
Numerical simulations calibrated on US data are provided.
关键词：optimal income taxation, tagging, takeup, extensive margin
