期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Bergen
摘要：Two-sided platform Örms serve distinct customer groups that are
connected through interdependent demand, and include major busi-
nesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry.
A well known result of tax incidence is that consumers of a more
heavily taxed good pay a higher price and thus buy less of the good.
The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided
market. On the contrary, a higher ad valorem tax may lower end-user
prices and spur sales. Thus, two-sided platform Örms may not at all en-
gage in tax shifting via price increases. We further show that a higher
ad valorem tax may undermine a Örmís incentive to di§erentiate its
product from that of its competitors. Finally, we demonstrate that
the e§ects of increasing speciÖc taxes may be the opposite of those of
increasing value added taxes
