期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Bergen
摘要：This paper examines optimal redistribution in a model with high and low-skilled individuals with
heterogeneous tastes for labor, that either work or not. With such double heterogeneity, it is well
known that traditional Utilitarian and Welfarist criteria suffer serious flaws. As a response, several
other criteria have been proposed in the literature. We compare the extent to which optimal
policies based on different normative criteria obey the principles of compensation (for differential
skills) and responsibility (for preferences for labor). Unsurprisingly, the criteria from the social
choice literature perform better in this regard than the traditional criteria, both in first and second
best. More importantly, these equality of opportunity criteria push the second best policy away
from an Earned Income Tax Credit and in the direction of a Negative Income tax.
关键词：optimal income taxation, equality of opportunity, heterogeneous preferences for labor.
