期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：University of London
摘要：The decision to request a preliminary injunction|a court order that bans a party from
certain behavior until its lawfulness is ascertained in a ¯nal court ruling at trial|is an
important litigation instrument in many areas of the law including antitrust, copyright,
patents, trademarks, employment and labor relations as well as contracts. The process
of ¯ling for a preliminary injunction and the court's ruling on such a request generates
information that can a®ect possible settlement decisions. We consider these implications
when there is uncertainty about both the plainti®'s damages as well as the merits of case
in the eyes of the court. Both plainti® and defendant revise their beliefs about the case
strength in dispute once they observe the court's ruling on preliminary injunctive relief.
We study how such learning a®ects the likelihood of settlement. A precursor to this
analysis is the study of the strategic role of preliminary injunctions as a means to signal
the plainti®'s willingness to settle.
