出版社：Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Potsdam
摘要：Since the financial crisis in August 1998 banks in Russia have somewhat
recovered but still operate on a comparably small scale. Banking reform was slow from 1999
to 2001 and has accelerated only recently. Yet proper accounting and auditing standards as
well as instruments for efficient prudential regulation and supervision are still not in place in
most of the banks, with the state-owned Sberbank being one of the worst offenders in this
respect. This paper argues that the biggest part of the sloppy performance of structural reform
in the banking sector should be attributed to the interest conflict occuring within the Central
Bank itself. It is the monetary authority, foreign exchange market regulator, supervisory body
for the banking sector and within this sector the most important player through its ownership
of Sberbank. Introducing competition – in association with tight regulatory rules – and thus a
higher degree of allocative efficiency to the banking sector will eventually damage the current
dominant market position of Sberbank and force it to open up its accounting books. Hence
separating Sberbank (and possibly banking regulation as well) from the Central Bank is a
crucial step on the road to a competitive Russian banking sector. Instead, several risks are
luring within Russia's banks, one of them being exchange rate risk. Given Russia's incomplete
financial markets and high interest rate differentials between Ruble denominated and hard
currency (i.e. US-Dollar) denominated loans, however, a dangerous potential for original sin
arises. Using a multiple regression model employed by FRANKEL/WEI and later by
MCKINNON, this paper shows that for the years since 1999 – particularly strong in 2001 and
2002 – on a daily basis a tight peg of the Ruble to the US-Dollar existed. Eliminating liquidity
risk from currency mismatch might be one reason for this tight tracking of the exchange rate
by the Central Bank as well as supporting Russia’s tradables sector. Large monetary expansion
through unsterilized interventions on the foreign exchange market to maintain the daily peg
and to prevent an appreciation of the Ruble has lead to ever more allocative distortions on the
Russian financial markets, drawing the exchange rate strategy of the Russian Central Bank
into question. With respect to moral hazard considerations, a daily peg might increase the
potential for original sin – the amount of currency mismatch – even further, with banks close
to the Central Bank’s strategic decisions being the most likely candidate for such behaviour.
关键词：Central Bank, Banking System, Exchange Rate, Russia
