期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
期号：8-13
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：We demonstrate that effectiveness of performance-contingent incentives is inversely related
to individual risk-aversion levels through two mechanisms: 1) rational optimizing decisions about
the amount of effort to supply when effort is positively correlated with risk exposure and 2) the
possibly choke-inducing stress accompanying financial uncertainty. In two laboratory studies using
real-effort tasks, we find a significant inverse relationship between productivity improvement under
performance pay and risk-aversion levels. Moreover, we show that both mechanisms help explain
this result. For about 25% of participants, performance actually deteriorates under performance pay,
and the probability of such deterioration increases with risk aversion and stress.
关键词：risk aversion, performance pay, incentive, stress, choking under pressure, productivity,
pay for performance, piece rate, experiment, compensation.
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