期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Bergen
摘要：This paper analyses the competitive e§ects of informative adver-
tising. The seminal work by Grossman and Shapiro (1984) show that
informative advertising results in lower prices and that Örms may ben-
eÖt from advertising restrictions. A crucial assumption in their model
is that captive (partially informed) consumers are not price respon-
sive. Replicating their model in a Hotelling duopoly version, we show
that results are in fact reversed if we allow for captive consumers to
respond to prices. We then use general demand functions and derive
exact conditions for the competitive e§ect to prevail. A main result is
that the procompetitive e§ect depends on the nature of competition
and the relative price elasticities of the monopoly and the competitive
demand segments.
