期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2003
卷号：2003
出版社：Bergen
摘要：This paper studies the interplay between public and private
health care in a National Health Service. We consider a two-stage
game, where at stage one a Health Authority sets the public sec-
tor wage and a subsidy to (or tax on) private provision. At stage
two the physicians decide how much to work in the public and the
private sector. We characterise di¤erent equilibria depending on
whether physicians coordinate labour supply or not, the physi-
cians’ job preferences, and the cost e¢ciency of private relative to
public provision. We …nd that private provision tends to crowd
out the NHS if physicians are su¢ciently indi¤erent about where
to work or the private sector is su¢ciently cost e¢cient. Com-
petition between physicians triggers a shift from public provision
towards private provision, and an increase in the total amount of
health care provided. The endogenous nature of labour supply
may have counter-intuitive e¤ects. For example, a cost reduction
in the private sector is followed by a higher wage in the public
sector.
