期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2003
卷号：2003
出版社：Bergen
摘要：Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its bud-
get to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate
the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of this
proposition, I show that the optimal type of agent depends on whether or
notcommittingtoagreatershareforrecipientswheretheproductivity
of aid is low is efficiency-enhancing. This is the case for donors not too
concerned with redistribution. They would therefore benefit from delegat-
ing the determination of the discretionary allocation rule to agents more
sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.
