期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Bergen
摘要：In this paper I look at the tax treatment of households under in-
dividual filings and characterise the efficiency properties of an income
tax schedule that redistributes from rich to poor households. Because
tax liabilities are determined on individual incomes but the decision
to earn those incomes are made at the household level, the tax liable
members of the same household can side trade leisure for net income
with one another, and such side trade enables them to carry out tax
arbitrage. I analyse the problem for a two class economy both with
and without perfect assortative mating. The main conclusion is that
the prevention of tax arbitrage imposes structure on the graduation
of the tax schedule.
