期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Bergen
摘要：Fund managers compete to attract new investors. Competition and fund management
contracts provide implicit and explicit incentives for fund management. I study the
combined effect of these two types of incentives on i) investors’ search for talented fund
managers and on ii) talented fund managers’ use of private investment signals. I show
that an intermediate level of competition yields less efficient use of private investment
signals and a lower average rate of return than in the case of either a high or a low level
of competition in the fund management industry. Furthermore, I show that although
explicit incentives improve managers’ use of private information, they may harm new
investors’ search for talented fund managers. Explicit incentives may improve current
performance, but cause prospective performance of the fund industry to deteriorate
关键词：competition, fund managers, incentives, performance, selection.
