期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Bergen
摘要：We analyze two-part tariffs in oligopoly, where each firm commits to a
certain quantity. The model is an extension of the one introduced in Har
(2001). We show that their main results are reversed when the model is
extended from one to two types of consumers. In particular, we find that
price per unit can exceed marginal costs, and the fixed fee can be below
costs. We also show that two-part tariffs may collapse, because each firm
would rather commit to a traditional Cournot price system (zero fixed fee).
Finally, some numerical examples illustrate that both firms serving both
types of consumers can be an equilibrium outcome in duopoly in cases
where the monopolist would serve only one type of consumers.
