期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Bergen
摘要：We analyze roaming policy in the market for mobile telecommunications. Firms
undertake investments in network infrastructure to increase geographical coverage, capacity
in a given area, or functionality. Prior to investments, roaming policy is determined. We show
that under collusion at the investment stage, firms' and a benevolent welfare maximizing
regulator's interests coincide, and no regulatory intervention is needed. When investments are
undertaken non-cooperatively, firms' and the regulator's interests do not coincide. Contrary to
what seems to be the regulator’s concern, firms would decide on a higher roaming quality
than the regulator. The effects of allowing a virtual operator to enter are also examined.
Furthermore, we discuss some implications for competition policy with regard to network
infrastructure investment
