期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2003
卷号：2003
出版社：University of London
摘要：A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the
likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no
atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable
paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and
the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertain whether the domestic
power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the domestic power will commit
more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the
paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power’s control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern
Ireland, and Middle East illustrate the models
