期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2003
卷号：2003
出版社：University of London
摘要：In this paper we model the interaction between parties and candidates to
highlight the mechanisms by which parties selecting candidates may disci-
pline legislators. The selection of candidates happens by majority voting of
party members. We assume a multidimentional policy space comprising an
ideological and a monetary dimension. Candidates are policy motivated on
the ideological dimension only. Hence they care more about winning elec-
tions the bigger the ideological distance from the candidate of the opponent
party. Therefore, parties can use strategically polarization to provide incen-
tives to candidates. Because of this strategic use of candidate polarization,
the polarization of the political race does not always reflect the polariza-
tion of voters’ preferences. In general, the polarization of the political race
seems to be a compromise between policy preferences of party members
and electoral goal as parties may use polarization strategically to provide
incentives
