期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, University of Essex
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：University of Essex
摘要：The paper proposes that the organization of Önancial markets is decided by the alloca-
tion of the liability to repay investors. Based on the liability allocation, the paper exam-
ines all possible modes of organizing Önance and monitoring in an economy a la Townsend
(1979). The equilibrium mode is either Financial Intermediation (FI) where the monitor
alone takes the liability, or Conglomeration where it is taken by a Conglomerate composed
of entrepreneurs and the monitor. Conglomeration also implements the beneÖt of diversi-
Öcation, which thus does not drive FI. Moreover, opposed to what Diamond (1984) would
predict, monitoring costs advantage FI
关键词：Allocation of the Liability Organization of Financial Markets Financial
Intermediation Conglomeration Mechanism Design
