期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：This paper analyzes the links between cash áow rights, control
rights and property rights in situations where a Örmís security holders
can manipulate earnings (intertemporal substitution). It is shown
that the allocation of these rights a§ects the incentives of claimholders
when intertemporal substitution activities are numerous and cannot
be contracted ex-ante. The main results we obtain are: 1) current
cash áow rights and residual property rights are connected through
the rule of marginal revenues; 2) the allocation of control rights does
not necessarily coincide with the allocation of residual property rights;
3) when current cash áow rights are two-part linear, and in some cases
when they are three-part linear, the problem of earnings manipulation
can be eliminated through the appropriate design of property rights.
However, for some contracts earnings manipulation is unavoidable.
This theory provides new insights into the link between di§erent rights
of the holders of securities.
关键词：earnings manipulations, intertemporal substitution, design of
securities, property rights, cash áow rights
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