期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：This paper analyzes the debt-equity choice for Önancing a two-stage in-
vestment when a Örmís insiders have private information about the Örmís
expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for ex-
ample when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term
earnings are private information) a separating equilibrium does not exist.
When private information is two-dimensional a separating equilibrium
may exist where Örms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue debt
and Örms with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity. This provides
new insights into the issue of di§erent kinds of securities by di§erent types
of Örms under asymmetric information as well as the link between debt-
equity choice and operating performance
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