期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their
"types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where
"good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a sig-
nalling game without types hierarchy. Di§erent types have the same average qualities but
di§erent proÖles of quality over time which are their private information. We apply this
idea to analyze a Önancing-investment game where Örmsíinsiders have private information
about the Örmís proÖt proÖle over time. Some Örms are ìperformance-improvingî with
increasing proÖt proÖles; others are ìstagnantîwith declining proÖt proÖles. We show that
equilibrium is either pooling with debt when the economy is stagnating, or separating when
the economy is growing (performance-improving Örms issue debt while stagnant Örms issue
shares). This provides new theoretical results that cannot be explained by the standard GB
models and which are consistent with some Önancial market phenomena.
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